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ANTICOMPETITIVE 
REGULATION IN THE
PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY
Ronald Mann* 
ABSTRACT
The payment card industry in the United States has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. The Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 reflects a high-water mark of congressional influence 
for the industry, altering bankruptcy procedures largely for the benefit of card issuers. Since that point, Congress 
has turned repeatedly to rein in perceived abuses in the industry. The most substantial and direct response to the 
perception of abuse is the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009. That statute was 
focused directly on the card industry and outlawed a wide variety of industry practices. More recently, in § 1075 (the 
“Durbin Amendment”) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress cut permissible 
interchange fees for debit card transactions to amounts that approximate the costs of processing those transactions; 
the Federal Reserve’s implementing regulation apparently will lead to a more than 50 percent decline in those fees.
So why is it at all noteworthy that Congress, in the course of reining in an industry targeted for excessive behavior, 
should require substantial changes in the industry’s operations? My hypothesis is a simple one. Both provisions make 
it more challenging to operate profitably in the payment card market. Because both provisions will pose greater 
challenges for smaller firms than they do for larger firms, both statutes will make it harder for smaller banks to 
compete in the payment card market. It may not be easy to evaluate the consequences of greater concentration in 
the industry. But it is clear that industry concentration is not what drove Congress to action: whatever else Congress 
was trying to do, it certainly was not trying to drive small banks from the payment card market
* Albert E. Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Co-Director of the Charles E. Gerber Program in Transactional Studies.
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I. THE CCA AND THE 
CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY 
A) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CREDIT CARD LENDING
To understand the competitive structure of 
the credit card industry, it is crucial 
to understand the shift in 
industry emphasis over the last 
few decades from finance to 
information technology.
Essentially, the goal of credit card issuers in those 
early days was to maximize the share of revolvers 
and minimize the share of transactors, while keeping 
chargeoffs at a relatively low level by excluding the risky. 
Even at that level of simplicity, the product was a risky 
one, as many issuers lost money, largely because of 
rampant fraud on the part of cardholders.5 But during 
the intervening years, the market has changed in several 
important ways, primarily because
Specifically, I argue that the profitability of firms in the 
industry—the growth and decline of their market shares, 
the success of their new products, and their vulnerability 
to competitors—depends much less on the cost of funds 
or any measure of care or “prudence” in underwriting 
than it does on the technological sophistication with 
which the firms design and manage their interactions 
with their customers. To explain this point, I start with a 
brief summary of the business of credit card issuers and 
how it has developed over time.
1. The Proliferation and Specialization of Credit Card 
Products
As recently as twenty years ago, the business of credit 
card issuing was a relatively simple one, with a more or 
less standard interest rate of 18 percent and three broad 
classes of potential customers: transactors, revolvers, and 
those too risky to receive cards.
Most importantly, issuers now offer a wide variety of 
products, which can be placed along a spectrum from 
transactor-based to revolver-based. As Figure 1 shows, 
the ratio of purchase volume to outstanding receivables 
differs remarkably even among the largest issuers. Some 
issuers, most notably American Express, focus primarily 
on transactors; with a transaction volume almost six 
times the size of its receivables, it stands apart from all of 
the other substantial issuers. Issuers of that product try 
to earn interchange fees that exceed the cost of funds, 
transaction costs, and any chargeoffs. Thus, those issuers 
attempt to maximize the number of cardholders that 
use their cards frequently for high-value purchases. The 
products directed to those customers are likely to include 
substantial affinity rewards and low interest rates.6
advances in information 
technology have improved 
the ability of credit card issuers 
to distinguish among their 
customers and thus segment 
their product offerings.
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Figure 1: Turnover Rates of Major Credit Card Issuers
Source: Author’s calculations from Nilson Report.
Figure shows ratio of expenditures on cards during 2010 to receivables at end of 2010.
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In contrast, a revolver-based product focuses primarily 
on revenues from interest and late or overlimit fees. 
Putting American Express to the side, most of the other 
large issuers emphasize a revolver-based model; as 
Figure One shows, Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, 
Capitol One, and Discover all have purchase volumes 
about twice their outstanding receivables. That product 
is less likely to have an annual fee and much more likely 
to have a high interest rate. The central task for the issuer 
of that product is to identify and attract customers who 
will carry substantial balances, without repaying them 
in full each month, and without defaulting (at least 
before they have paid on the balances for a period long 
enough to amortize the card issuer’s investment in the 
customer). That model also depends, at least in part, on 
late and overlimit fees. 7
Figure 2 traces the development of that model. Several 
points are salutary. First, it documents the doubling 
of the rate of those fees during the 1990s, as issuers 
swarmed to the model. After a peak lasting until about 
2004, however, the level of those fees began to decline. 
A number of possible explanations are apparent.  The 
first is simply that consumers began to avoid these fees 
by altering their conduct to avoid late and overlimit 
transactions; as the fees became more common, 
consumers learned of their costs and used greater efforts 
to ensure that they did not accidentally charge beyond
their credit limit or pay their bills late. To the extent late 
and overlimit fees resulted from accidental errors, rather 
than liquidity constraints, this would make sense. A 
broader, and not entirely unrelated, explanation is that 
more sophisticated contracting structures developed to 
increase interest revenues unrelated to the interest rate – 
double-cycle billing, minimum finance charges, and the 
like. As sophisticated issuers introduced those product 
attributes, the pressure to generate revenues from late 
and overlimit fees diminished, and their share of industry 
revenues similarly declined.8
One additional trend of importance, along a spectrum 
distinct from the transactor/revolver distinction, is the 
rise of affinity and rewards products. Because there is 
a cognizable cost to acquire and maintain each credit 
card account, all issuers focus on ensuring that those 
to whom they issue their cards use them as frequently 
as possible. Industry executives designing products 
frequently emphasize their desire that their cards will 
be “top of the wallet.” The more the cards are used, the 
more profitable the issuer’s operations. Because issuers 
cannot compete on acceptance (in the United States 
there is, with the exception of Discover, little variation 
in acceptance among the major brands), affinity and 
rewards cards play a particular role in the competition 
for “top of the wallet status.” Traditionally, specialized 
monoline issuers like MBNA dominated that business, 
Figure 2: Late and Overlimit Fees (1990-2008)
Source: Cards Profitability Survey.
Figure shows ratio of late and overlimit fees to annual expenditures on cards.
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but through acquisitions, that business has for the 
most part fallen into the hands of Bank of America and 
JPMorgan Chase.
The combination of those trends produces a mind-
boggling potential for variation in product design. 
Driven both by consolidation (as the larger issuers 
acquire the portfolios of smaller issuers) and by market 
pressures, most of the large issuers now have large 
suites of products, including dozens of distinct credit 
card products, all targeting particular niches along the 
spectrum from transactors to revolvers, and particular 
pockets of affinity (specified sports teams, universities, 
social causes, and the like). For example, as of the fall of 
2011, Bank of America displayed 72 distinct credit card 
products at its Web site. Although other issuers can’t 
compete with that diversity, the number of distinct 
products at other major issuers is still impressive: U.S. 
Bank’s web site advertises 29 different cards, CitiBank’s 
27, Chase’s 20, and Capitol One’s 14. Even once-stodgy 
American Express advertises 22 different products (15 of 
which are credit cards and 7 of which are charge cards). 
time.
2. Proprietary Predictive Models
The complexity and heterogeneity of modern credit card 
products presents numerous challenges to businesses 
that attempt to issue them profitably. For one thing, the 
issuance of cards involves a substantial expenditure—
the process of sending solicitations, responding to 
applications, and issuing cards—that will produce no 
revenues at all unless the cardholder in fact begins 
to use the card for purchases. And if the cardholder 
maintains an unpaid balance, the consequent lending is 
rife with risks that are unusual for the typical bank lender. 
Unlike the lender on a home or a car, the lender has no 
collateral. The lender has no control over the uses to 
which the money is put. The debt is to be repaid over an 
extended period of time, on a payment schedule for the 
most part selected by the customer. 
capably in light of those projections. There is a great 
deal of room for increased (or decreased) profitability 
based on the level of sophistication applied to those 
activities.
The difficulties issuers faced in the early days of the 
credit card industry arose directly from the primitive 
information technology then available to the issuers 
and networks. Thus, it was a bold development 
in the early years of the 1970s when Visa for the 
first time could introduce electronic processing to 
clear transactions among the various credit card 
companies—something that now is a simple and 
routine matter.
For the most part today, what distinguishes those who 
are successful and profitable from their competitors 
is skill at collecting, manipulating, and analyzing 
information. The historical example of Providian is 
conspicuous. At one time, it was a major player in 
the subprime market, but its inability to understand 
the risks inherent in its portfolio led to unsustainably 
high levels of chargeoffs, which eventually forced it to 
withdraw from that sector.
Issuers do not simply guess what customers will do with 
the cards that are offered or issued to them. Nor, like 
mortgage lenders, do they rely on third-party scoring 
systems (like Fair Isaacs) that are readily available to all 
in the industry. Rather, at all points along the lifecycle of 
each account (from the universe of potential customers 
through the group of existing customers at any given 
time), issuers access and gather immense databases, 
which they analyze in an effort to understand the likely 
patterns of use and risk associated with each customer 
profile. The more information issuers can use in their 
models, the better those models can predict future card 
use and the risks associated with each individual. 
The better models predict future use and chargeoff 
risks, the better the issuer’s ability to acquire (and retain) 
profitable customers and to avoid (or shed) unprofitable 
customers. The benefits drop straight to the issuer’s 
bottom line. Models that more precisely and accurately 
predict the likelihood and timing of chargeoffs will 
allow the issuer to design a more profitable mix of 
product solicitations and to manage existing accounts 
in ways that attract or repel customers that are less (or 
more) likely to generate chargeoffs. Together, those 
will allow the issuer to keep lower reserves against 
future chargeoffs. Lower chargeoffs and lower reserve 
requirements lead directly to increased profitability. 
predicting which ones are likely to use the cards, 
whether they are likely to default, and how long it is 
likely to be before they default; and managing accounts
Thus, a successful credit card lender must 
have expertise at surveying the potential 
customers available to it;
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Improving predictive models benefits issuers at several 
stages of the life cycle of a particular customer. First, 
the issuer with a better model of consumer behavior 
will be able to do a better job of targeting solicitations 
to the customers. The process of sending solicitations 
is extremely expensive, largely because the response 
rate has fallen significantly even as the number of 
solicitations has increased: CitiBank alone sent more 
than 350 million solicitations in the third quarter of 
2011, expending about a quarter of a billion dollars.9 
The goal of each solicitation is to get as high a response 
rate as possible from the most desirable group of 
customers.
Thus, a solicitation can fail either because too few 
people respond, or because the group that responds is 
a surprisingly unprofitable group of customers. Given 
the amount of money at stake, it should be no surprise 
that the issuers sending such a blizzard of solicitations 
invest heavily in technology to predict and improve the 
responses they receive.
Improved predictive models also benefit issuers when 
they set the terms of the cards that are issued when 
cardholders respond to the solicitation. As individual 
cardholders respond to a single solicitation, issuers 
allocate different terms (interest rates, grace periods, 
credit limits) based on the issuers’ assessment of the 
likely future behavior of the responding customers. 
Again, issuers can err by issuing too few cards (and thus 
losing desirable customers to other issuers) or by issuing 
too many cards (and thus issuing cards that are under-
used or lead to chargeoffs).
Perhaps the most important use of these kinds of 
predictive models involves the ongoing management 
of existing cardholder accounts. Relying on those 
models, issuers use predictions about future cardholder 
behavior to make instantaneous and precisely targeted 
decisions about such things as increases or decreases in 
credit limits, alterations in interest rates, and responses 
to overlimit transactions or late payments. For example, 
sophisticated issuers customarily use predictive tools 
widely for such purposes as updating credit limits, 
issuing balance transfer offers, setting prices, and 
identifying likely future chargeoffs.
In sum, although it is an exaggeration to say that 
lending expertise is no longer important in the credit 
card industry, it is just as true that lending expertise and 
caution standing alone are not enough to compete 
successfully.
B) THE CCA AND CREDIT CARD LENDING
Against that backdrop, it is useful to consider the 
CCA. For present purposes, the principal substantive 
provisions of the CCA fall into two categories. The first 
category includes prohibitions on conduct reasonably 
characterized as sharp dealing, by which I mean 
contractual attributes and business practices that are 
substantially more costly to the customer than any 
efficiency or cost saving they might produce for the 
issuer. In this category, for example, I would include the 
prohibition on double-cycle billing,10 the requirement 
that cardholders opt in to over-the-limit fees,11 the rules 
requiring prompt crediting of payments,12 and the strict 
limits on “fee harvester” cards.13
None of those provisions should substantially affect 
competition among the major players in the credit card 
industry by which I mean, loosely speaking, the large 
issuers identified in Figure 1, who increasingly control 
the market for credit card lending. In some cases, 
including fee harvesting, the provisions outlaw activity 
in which none of those issuers ever engaged.14 In 
others, they outlaw arguably fraudulent behavior that 
was already within the control of federal regulators, 
such as unreasonable limitations on crediting 
payments.15 In still others, they outlaw contract terms 
that major issuers had already stopped using before 
Congress enacted the CCA, like the practice of double-
cycle billing.16
Those provisions probably are beneficial, because they 
outlaw conduct that serves no useful purpose. But they 
will not individually or collectively have any important 
affect on the way in which issuers design products and 
compete against each other.
The limitations on interest-rate increases in § 101 of the 
CCA (adding § 171 to the Truth in Lending Act17) stand 
out as qualitatively different. Among other things, that 
statute generally prohibited “retroactive” interest rate 
increases: interest rate increases that apply to funds 
already borrowed from the lender. 
The only exception is for a variable interest rate 
that changes because of an index, rather than the 
borrower’s individual characteristics or because of a 
failure of the borrower to make required minimum 
payments on the card account. This requires a major 
shift in business practices, amounting to a fundamental 
recasting of the basics of credit card underwriting.
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Even with the predictions of future behavior drawn 
from their sophisticated modeling, credit card issuers 
traditionally have relied on product attributes that let 
them respond in real time to shifts in the perceived 
riskiness of their customer base. This is at least in part 
because so many of the adverse events that increase the 
riskiness of a particular customer are random events that 
have so little to do with an individual’s past history that 
even the best modeling can do little to predict them. 
Thus, credit card issuers traditionally have reserved in their 
contracts the ability to increase interest rates on individual 
customers at any time or from time to time, for almost any 
reason that motivates the issuer to think this prudent.18
It always was common, of course, to increase interest 
rates in response to a failure of the borrower to make 
the required payments on the credit card account. But 
many lenders used “universal default” provisions, under 
which they increased interest rates on a credit card 
whenever they learned (through credit bureaus and 
the like) of a default by their customer on any other 
account: so the credit card interest rate went up, even if 
the cardholder was keeping that account current, solely 
because of a default on an electric bill. 
Even more aggressively, some lenders took the 
opportunity of repricing interest rates before the 
cardholder defaulted on any payment, solely because of 
a shift in attributes that, in the judgment of the lender, 
increased the borrower’s risk profile.19
This is related to the practice, central to the revolving-
credit business model, of issuing cards on the 
expectation that cardholders will build balances on 
them relatively quickly and then pay them off slowly, 
over a long number of years.20 The balance-transfer 
method of acquiring customers epitomizes this: instead 
of waiting for your own customers to charge up their 
balances, you acquire customers that have already built 
up balances on the cards of other issuers, gambling 
that if you do your underwriting properly they will 
take so long to pay off the balances that you will profit 
even after paying whatever enticement you offered to 
acquire them.
The market-oriented premise of this regime is that if the 
issuer increases the rate excessively, the cardholder can 
avoid the excessive charges by repaying the credit card 
lender. By hypothesis, the cardholder would simply shift 
its outstanding balance to any other lender willing to 
lend at a lower rate; if the cardholder is borrowing at
any given time from the lender offering the lowest rate, 
then the cardholder has little about which to complain.
That market-oriented perspective overlooks a great 
deal of the reality that confronts the borrower. Most 
obviously, the borrower’s ability to repay the lender 
is likely to be most limited at the moment the lender 
raises interest rates: if interest rates are raised when the 
borrower experiences financial distress, the borrower 
likely will find it hard to repay its credit card lender out 
of ready cash or to find a new lender willing to lend at a 
modest rate. 
At the same time, by increasing the interest rate on the 
outstanding credit card debt, the lender increases the 
borrower’s financial distress by increasing the borrower’s 
monthly obligations.
Thus, whatever its premise, in practice the real-time 
interest-rate adjustment is likely to complicate the 
borrower’s efforts to respond to financial distress, if not 
tip the borrower over the edge entirely. 
Seen against that business model, the prohibition on 
retroactive interest rate increases is a major challenge. If 
credit card lenders cannot shift interest rates in response 
to changes in the borrower’s risk profile as they occur, 
the lender instead must set an interest rate before 
advancing funds to the borrower in the first instance—a 
rate which must be adequate to compensate for all 
anticipated shifts in riskiness that can be foreseen as 
likely to occur before the debt will be repaid. 
This is particularly complicated for borrowers that are 
likely to build up a substantial balance early in their 
relationship and then carry that balance for many years 
into the future, slowly making payments on it but not 
completely paying off the balance. 
For those customers, the interest rate established at the 
beginning of the relationship, when the lender has little 
or no experience of the borrower’s repayment behavior, 
will be the interest rate that must stick with the account 
for what well might be an extended time period. It is 
easy to see that this increases by an order of magnitude 
the difficulty of the underwriting and risk-modeling task 
that faces the credit card lender. It is safe to say that only 
the most sophisticated of credit card lenders will have 
adjusted to that challenge without difficulty.
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C) CONCENTRATION IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY
The natural question to ask is why anybody should be 
concerned that Congress has made the task of credit 
card underwriting harder. After all, the avowed purpose 
of the CCA was to rein in the industry, and making the 
task harder should lower the profits of those lenders 
and thus lower the absolute or relative amount of that 
lending in the economy. If credit card lending imposes 
a negative external cost on society, then anything that 
lessens credit card lending is beneficial.21
The truth, I believe, is considerably more complex. The 
central problem is the industrial organization of the 
credit card industry, which is fissured not only along 
the lines of differing strategies of credit card lending 
as discussed in Part I, supra, but also into lending and 
non-lending sectors. Thus, although there are several 
thousand general-purpose credit card issuers, the 
number of significant debt issuers is much smaller.
As of 2010, the share of receivables held by the top ten 
issuers (those that appear in Figure 1) was about 87 
percent; the top four issuers alone (JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, CitiBank, and American Express) held 
60 percent.22
The heavy concentration of credit card lending in 
such a small group of issuers is not a coincidence. The 
profits from “ordinary” credit card issuance, reliant on 
interchange fees, involve many of the typical attributes 
of expertise broadly distributed throughout the banking 
industry: building customer loyalty, attraction to the 
bank’s brand, and the like. 
Thus, it is much easier for “ordinary” banks to compete 
in the business of having their customers use their 
credit cards for ordinary day-to-day transactions. This 
is especially true when the credit cards are issued as 
one part of a broader relationship, and thus need not 
generate significant profit on a standalone basis. It is 
much harder, though, for the reasons discussed, supra 
Part I, and infra Part II, to issue credit card debt profitably. 
Thus, the rapidly increasing sophistication of that 
business brought on by the use of information 
technology in the last two decades has made it 
increasingly hard for smaller issuers to compete, steadily 
driving them from that business and driving lending 
portfolios ineluctably into the hands of the largest and 
most technologically sophisticated issuers.
Seen through that lens, the dead weight 
dropped on the industry by § 
171 has a different meaning: 
it is yet another challenge to 
the “ordinary” banks trying to 
compete against the few largest technologically 
sophisticated credit card lenders. For the largest banks, 
§ 171 should pose a challenge, but not an insuperable 
one, as they presumably have been able to modify 
their products to predict future repayment behaviors 
relatively well. For smaller banks, however, with less 
cutting-edge modeling expertise, this should accelerate 
their move out of the lending market.
To be sure, those banks could invest in the modeling 
technology necessary to price their products as 
effectively as the large banks, but for several reasons 
this is likely to be quite difficult. The most obvious is 
that because their portfolios are smaller, they will have 
a smaller asset base over which to amortize the costs of 
their investment. 
This problem is exacerbated by the rapid segmentation 
of products, infra Section I.A.1. 
Where the portfolios of the larger issuers can be split 
into dozens of separate pieces, each with separate 
underwriting and pricing criteria, yet still large enough 
for effective modeling, the much smaller portfolios of 
the smaller issuers make it quite difficult for them to 
compete in specific segments. 
A small issuer with a portfolio a fraction the size of the 
ones held by JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America will 
find it much more difficult to obtain enough customers 
in any particular segment to compete effectively against 
the precisely targeted products of those issuers. They will 
have many fewer customers in any particular segment, 
and thus much less information on which to form 
predictions about the likely use and repayment behavior 
of those customers if they do issue a competitive card. 
If they respond to the uncertainty by higher pricing, 
then almost by definition their products will not be 
competitive. 
It is, then, difficult to see how the smaller issuers can 
hope, in the longer run, to compete on card product 
definition and management standing alone. They must, 
if they are to remain in the market, compete on a “whole 
relationship” basis.
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II. THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 
AND THE DEBIT CARD 
INDUSTRY 
A) THE ROLE OF DEBIT CARDS IN BANK ACCOUNT 
RELATIONSHIPS
Although their use at the point of sale is functionally 
similar to that of credit cards, the role of debit cards 
in financial services is completely different. Credit 
card markets are dominated by large national (and 
multinational) banks that hold gigantic portfolios 
unrelated to their deposit structures. Thus, the largest 
portfolios are constructed, for the most part, of 
customers that have no depositary relationship with the 
issuer, and often no relationship beyond the card at all.23  
The rise of securitized financing played a major role in 
weakening the link to deposits, because it provided what 
seemed to be a low-cost and reliable source of funding 
that allowed banks like MBNA, Providian, and Capitol 
One to issue credit card loans in sizes that far exceeded 
the deposit base that was the traditional source of funds 
for credit card lending. Even now, with Capitol One 
the only remaining major credit card lender without a 
nationally significant deposit base, large-scale funding 
of credit card loans through securitized financing leaves 
the tie between deposits and credit card lending thin at 
best.24
The situation with debit cards is quite different. Debit 
cards are almost universally issued by a bank with which 
the cardholder has a deposit-account relationship.25 
Thus, debit cards and their pricing are an integral part 
of a larger relationship. This has several ramifications for 
the industry’s structure. For one thing, because debit 
card issuance loosely parallels deposit collection, the 
debit card industry is much less concentrated than the 
credit card industry. For example, the top four debit 
card issuers (by purchase volume) control only 39 
percent of the market; the top ten, less than half the 
market.26
 
Second, revenues from debit cards interact much more 
broadly with the account relationship; their “subsidy” is 
not internal to the product as it is for credit cards. Thus, 
debit card interchange fees essentially have funded 
free or low-cost checking accounts. Generally speaking, 
revenues from debit card interchange fees, in the range 
of fifty cents per transaction since settlement of the Visa 
and MasterCard antitrust litigation27 in the early years of
the century, have provided revenues that offset the 
costs of checking account services, especially for 
customers with relatively low average balances. Among 
other things, this has facilitated broader penetration 
of mainstream checking account services to low- and 
middle-income populations.28
The price structure reflects the reality that debit cards, 
like credit cards, are a two-sided product. Thus, the 
manager of the relevant network must coordinate 
prices and terms for two distinct groups of users, 
managing those terms and prices to maximize the value 
to be derived from use of the product. 
For credit cards, relatively high interchange revenues 
(charges imposed by the networks on the merchants) 
traditionally have facilitated quite generous terms for 
cardholders, including extensive rewards programs, 
which have fostered rapidly growing card usage. The 
parallel for debit cards has been interchange charges 
on merchants at levels sufficiently high to provide 
resources that facilitate broad provision of relatively 
low-cost bank accounts as a benefit to the cardholder 
side.29
Although merchants understandably have opposed 
cost structures in which they bear the brunt of 
expenses, the product borne from those cost structures 
has been undeniably successful.
As Figure 3 illustrates, debit card usage (as a share of 
consumer payment transactions) has increased from 
about 1 percent in 1994 to more than 25 percent in 
2009, surpassing both credit cards and checks. Much 
of that growth has come at the expense of declining 
check use. Because checks are a paper-based payment 
system with high transaction costs, the shift to an 
electronically cleared system like debit cards presents 
a clear social benefit.30 To the extent debit card growth 
also comes at the expense of credit card use, as seems 
to be the case since 2007, there is a parallel social gain 
to the extent that routine debit card use limits the 
unreflective borrowing associated with routine credit 
card use.31
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Figure 3: Check, Credit Card, and Debit Card
Transaction Shares (1994-2009)
Source: Author’s calculations from Nilson Report.
Figure shows ratio of expenditures on cards during 2010 to receivables at end of 2010.
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B) THE DURBIN AMENDMENT AND DEBIT CARD ISSUANCE
The Durbin Amendment to Dodd-Frank strikes at the 
heart of that system, requiring a drop in debit card 
interchange fees to a cost-justified level. Specifically 
(as codified in the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)),32 the 
Durbin Amendment requires the Federal Reserve to 
define a cap on interchange fees that is “reasonable 
and proportional to” the issuer’s costs.33 Also, in an 
effort to bolster downward pressure on network-level 
interchange pricing, the statute requires that each card 
have “bugs” from at least two non-affiliated networks, so 
that a merchant has two different ways to process each 
transaction.34
To implement the statute, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, exercising authority delegated to it by 
the Durbin Amendment, originally proposed a fee cap 
of 12 cents per transaction, a stark drop from preexisting 
market levels averaging about 50 cents. 
In response to voluminous comments on its proposed 
rule, the Federal Reserve ultimately adopted a final 
rule35 that sets a cap of 21 cents plus .05 percent of 
the transaction amount, amounting to approximately 
24 cents per transaction.36 As compared to preexisting 
market levels, this amounts to a revenue drop of about 
50 percent.37
C) CONCENTRATION IN DEBIT CARD ISSUANCE
As a matter of economic theory, the Durbin Amendment 
is profoundly wrong-headed. It is premised on the 
notion that lack of competition in the debit card 
industry has led to an unnaturally elevated price that 
banks collusively charge to merchants for the debit card 
product. 
But there is no reason to expect a priori that a network 
in a fully competitive environment would set a price 
on either side that bears any predictable relation to the 
costs of providing services to that side. 
Thus, the acknowledged fact that existing interchange 
fees are, for many banks, higher than the costs of 
processing debit card transactions proves nothing at all 
about the efficiency of the market or the “correct” debit 
interchange price. The relevant question is whether the 
networks are setting prices that maximize growth of 
their network. The rapid uptake in debit cards in recent 
years (summarized, supra Figure 3) suggests that they 
are. 
To put it bluntly, economic theory suggests no reason 
to think that shifting to a cost-justified level of fees for 
debit card interchange will improve the efficiency of the 
affected markets.
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To be sure, the statute rejects that understanding of the 
debit card market and proceeds on the supposition that 
existing prices reflect improper price-fixing by the major 
networks. Even on that basis, however, there is great 
reason to expect that the statute will have a substantial 
adverse effect on market structure. 
On its face, the statute bears evidence of Congress’s 
intention to protect small issuers. Specifically, cards 
issued by small issuers (those with less than $10 billion 
of assets) are exempted from the price-level restrictions 
imposed by TILA § 920(a).38 For several reasons, however, 
it is likely that the statute will disadvantage the smaller 
institutions singled out for protection by the small-issuer 
exemption.
The first and practical reason is that networks have 
little or no incentive to establish separate, higher price 
levels for their smallest and least influential issuers. 
As discussed above, networks that control two-sided 
products like debit cards thrive by coordinating the 
prices and terms on the two sides of the network so as 
to maximize the growth of the network. 
Among other things, they must attract transactions to 
their network and they can do that only by attracting 
issuers that issue large volumes of cards. The basic 
problem this creates is that networks that establish 
special elevated pricing for small issuers will offend their 
most important issuers, the large issuers on whose cards 
the overwhelming majority of debit card transactions 
occur.
The second is the ability of the merchant to steer 
customers away from high-cost cards. For one thing, 
the Durbin Amendment allows merchants to control 
routing, to select whatever network they prefer from the 
networks on a card, and small issuers are not exempt 
from that provision.40 
Furthermore, although the Durbin Amendment does 
prohibit merchants from discriminating on the basis 
of an issuer’s identity,41 it does not prohibit them from 
discriminating on the basis of price. 
Accordingly, it appears that merchants could lawfully 
refuse to accept small-issuer cards on any network 
that allows small issuers to collect substantially greater 
interchange fees than the Durbin Amendment caps for 
large issuers.
The third reason that the Durbin Amendment is likely 
to affect small issuers particularly harshly relates to the 
cost structure of the industry. Before promulgating 
Regulation II, the Federal Reserve collected data from 
issuers on their cost structures. 
The data show substantial economies of scale in the 
costs of debit card processing. For the largest issuers, 
average variable costs appear to be less than four cents 
per debit card transaction; for those issuers, Regulation 
II leaves approximately twenty cents per transaction to 
subsidize other account services. 
This is, to be sure, much less than what they had 
before the Durbin Amendment, but it is a substantial 
continuing revenue stream. For most small issuers, 
by contrast, average variable costs appear to exceed 
twenty-five cents per transaction.42 
Thus, for those issuers, transactions processed at the 
cap would be processed at a loss; not only would this 
eliminate the subsidy of other services entirely, it would 
require a flow of funds from other sources to debit-card 
processing. For those institutions, then, maintaining 
revenues substantially above the Regulation II cap is 
not only attractive, it is crucial to the existing business 
model. Because continuation of those revenue levels is 
unlikely, small issuers face daunting challenges in the 
years to come.
III. ROOTING OUT 
COMPETITION
So what does this mean? Let us suppose I am correct in 
my conjecture that the CCA and the Durbin Amendment 
will exacerbate the market push driving relatively small 
banks from the payment card industry. What adverse 
effects can we attribute to this? The first and obvious 
one is lessening competition.
Although it is easy to suggest that competition between 
Visa and MasterCard has rarely been aggressive, 
competition at the bank level traditionally has been 
vigorous. 
Thus, the most likely response of large 
networks is to adopt fee structures that 
minimize the revenue advantages of 
small issuers over large issuers.39
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For credit card issuance, thousands of issuers produce 
a blizzard of television advertisements and billions of 
annual solicitations sent by mail. For the basic business 
of consumer banking, the medium is different—the 
local billboard supplementing nationwide television 
advertising campaigns—but the market for consumer 
banking accounts traditionally has been relatively 
robust.43
Yet as the number of effective players falls ever lower,
This is particularly salient in the credit card sector given 
the trend toward segmentation, which allows larger 
issuers to provide products that can compete nationally 
for smaller and smaller groups of precisely defined 
customers. 
The consequences of such a decline of competition, 
at least under classic economic theory, are simple: an 
increase in price and a fall in supply. It is safe to assume 
that neither Congress nor the federal competition 
regulators (the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission) would applaud a conspicuous 
decline in competition in such an important industry. 
Indeed, the Durbin Amendment was enacted on the 
stated premise that small issuers would be protected.
For several reasons, however, I doubt this simplistic take 
on the competitive impact of these statutes is adequate. 
On the one hand, it is easy to argue after the recent 
economic meltdown that unbridled competition by 
financial institutions is itself socially harmful. What we 
have seen in the last decade is the specter of financial 
institutions substantially unconstrained by regulators, 
driven by cutthroat competition into lending that was so 
plainly imprudent as to drive the world financial system 
to the brink of collapse. 
Commentators can speculate and argue about what 
particular piece of the system led to such an exuberance 
of irrationally imprudent lending. Was it the existence 
of deposit insurance and related regulatory institutions 
that left banks too little concerned about the effects of 
imprudent lending?44 
Was it the markets that allowed (or even encouraged) 
banks to make loans based on insupportable valuations 
by making it so easy for them to transfer the risks of 
nonpayment to others?45 
Was it the relative asymmetry of institutions that made 
it easy to withdraw home equity during times of rising 
prices but left no similar exit strategy for times of 
falling prices?46 Or was it the failure of financial analysts 
to understand the nature of the risks created by the 
financial instruments into which these loans were 
packaged?47 
Whatever the reason for the problem was, it is clear that 
unbridled competition exacerbated the problems into 
which they have driven our economy. Accordingly, we 
should acknowledge at least one beneficial side effect 
to reforms that undermine vigorous competition in 
financial markets: they lessen the risks we all face from 
destructive competition in those markets.
On the other hand, a look at the particular actors 
affected here tells a less sanguine story of the aggregate 
effects of these statutes. In both cases, they accelerate 
shifts away from an older, more relational style of 
financial services toward a more information- and 
product-centered model based in technocratic norms. 
Thus, if I am right in thinking that the CCA is effectively 
driving the smaller, more relational issuers from the 
lending sector of the credit-card industry, the market 
response will not be limited to a decline in competition 
about price. It also includes a broader eradication of a 
model of banking in which the bank sees a credit card as 
one of a suite of products issued to a particular customer, 
out of which the bank needs to profit in aggregate. 
Because this model involves less of the highly aggressive 
lending characteristic of the largest, most information-
intensive lending experts, it probably has less of the 
adverse social costs that go with that lending. If the only 
issuers with competitive significance are the very largest 
and most technologically focused lenders, we should be 
concerned about the potential for a shift to
the point is coming (if it is not 
already here) when there are 
few issuers competing for the 
business of any particular 
consumer.
a market in which all credit 
card lending is conducted at 
the harsh edge of riskiness that 
maximizes the adverse social 
cost of the product.
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The Durbin Amendment’s effects are likely parallel. By 
putting inordinate pressure on the cost structures of 
community banks and credit unions,
and away from the smaller, more fragmented localized 
financial institutions. This seems particularly perverse, 
given the role money-center institutions played in 
the recent crisis and given the unique role the smaller 
institutions play in funneling capital to small businesses 
and employers remote from national financial centers.
It would be easy to view these statutes through a simple 
public-choice model as yet two more examples of 
the continuing political power of the largest financial 
institutions.48 To me, however, it makes more sense to 
emphasize the particular perversity that the CCA and 
the Durbin Amendment share: a failure to recognize 
the links between product design and market structure. 
The central flaw in the CCA is its failure to recognize the 
relation between interest-rate flexibility and the ability of 
smaller banks to manage credit card lending effectively.
Given Congress’s stated intention to protect small 
institutions in Durbin, I find it more accurate to view 
the statutes as example of ineptitude – poor craft in 
policymaking – than venality in intentionally favoring 
the interests of the largest institutions. I leave it to the 
reader to judge which perspective bodes better for the 
future of financial regulation.
the statute is likely to accelerate 
the shift toward the large 
money-center institutions
The central weakness of the Durbin 
Amendment is its misunderstanding of 
the relation between interchange fee 
levels and the cost structure of small 
institutions.
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